We continue with the next 2 chapters of Senator McCarthy's background speech on one George Catlett Marshall,and sobering reading it is to those who seek to bring into focus the events that led to a new order being imposed on the American populace without their knowledge.The leaders of a sovereign nation, would NOT do what was done with regard to foreign policy at the Close of WW II and the intervening almost 11 years.Do not get it wrong, it did not stop after 11 years, as it continues full bore right up to today. No the 11 years signifies my birth in 1956, and the 60 years in between has brought me through MY study of history, to understand I was born into a Lie. Land of The Free? Home of The Brave? I pledge my allegiance? All propaganda started in our lives as innocent children.If it was a land of freedom, how come my Brother could not decide himself if he wanted to go fight in SE Asian jungles? Home of the Brave?really? I was only 7 years old at the time but Dallas sure looked like the work of COWARDS to me,and allegiance? to what? a damn flag,ask around folks,ask people from other countries what that flag has come to represent, and I guarantee more times then not you are going to hear the word TYRANNY. So excuse me for being so forthright with you on this matter, but America needs to wake the hell up to the FACT that a new order foreign to Liberty is NOT coming but in FACT was put into place some 70 years, and that what you are sensing is NOT it's arrival, but rather its perfection and lock down on the American populace. As a country we need to STEP BACK from this globalization crap, and these politicians pushing it. We need REAL LEADERS,to take back the Power of The State,that they stole from us that November day 63 years ago.
The Story of
GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL
by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy
The Struggle for Eastern Europe
We now come to what was with out question the most significant decision of the war in Europe: the decision by Marshall, which was made against Roosevelt's half-hearted wishes and 17 Churchill's bulldog determination, to concentrate on France and leave the whole of Eastern Europe to the Red armies. This strategical struggle was pursued with great vigor, sometimes becoming very violent on both sides. It only reached its terminal point at Tehran, as we shall see, where the combined weight of Stalin and Marshall defeated Churchill. I cannot dwell too urgently on this great decision. Its military effects were of no very great importance, although the unnecessary invasion of southern France, enjoined by Stalin and Marshall, gave Kesselring a welcome breathing spell in northern Italy and protracted Mark Clark's campaign for the Po with an attendant loss of American lives. It is the political consequences of this controversy which stand forth in all their stark implications for us today. I will attempt to summarize the debate briefly.
The British, from the beginning of the strategical discussions over North Africa , had been intent on carrying the war into the Mediterranean. Their motives were mixed. Foremost perhaps was their desire to relieve their forces in Egypt, which had suffered several crushing blows. Secondarily, they wanted the use of the Mediterranean for very obvious purposes of communication. Thirdly, the British have had for many generations a paramount position in the eastern Mediterranean and had wide interests both in those lands and in the Suez Canal as a gateway to India and their great possessions and dependencies in the Orient and the Southern Seas. There was a further and personal factor, which Marshall frequently characterized as the Prime Minister's preoccupation with eccentric operations, such as the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign in World War I with which Churchill's name will be forever associated . Overshadowing and of much more importance, of course, as we see it now and as we get glimpses in the writings of the principal actors of those times, was a steady desire on the part of the British to reach Eastern Europe and the Balkans before the Red armies.
I think there can be no question that Hanson Baldwin is correct when he stigmatizes our military planning in this connection as short-sighted. Churchill, with his intimate and profound knowledge of the continuing drama of Europe, knew that a war is only a phase of history. Victory is one thing; where you stand at the end of a war is another. He had the ability to foresee what Europe would look like as a result of certain policies.
Marshall triumphed over Churchill at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943 with reference to this question. That conference marked the end of Churchill's sway over the great decisions of the war. Thereafter the policy of the United States in the European war was wholly and without deviation the policy announced by Joseph Stalin. There was a break in the relations between the two English-speaking powers, which were carrying the brunt of the war, and the United States thereafter was found always on the side of Stalin. To obtain this result, Marshall bore down on British preoccupation with the Mediterranean. I have enumerated some of the basic factors in the British position. Marshall ignored all of these except the one addressed to British self-interest. He minimized and derided the British position, likewise ridiculing the Prime Minister's strategical judgment by frequent references to the Dardanelles.
I believe that the rupture of interest between the United States and Great Britain signified by this decision was one of the most fateful changes in world relationships of our times. It America's Retreat From Victory embittered our relationships at the first Quebec meeting, at Cairo, and at Tehran.
At the moment let me generalize that the year 1943 was by all odds the critical year of the war, casting its shadow over the whole postwar period in which we now find ourselves convulsed by anxiety and doubt. It was in February of 1943 that the Russian achieved victory over the Germans at Stalingrad. In fact, it can, I believe, be safely stated that World War III started with the Russian victory at Stalingrad. Thereafter, they opened their diplomatic war against the West when they gave every evidence of turning upon the Polish armies, the Polish people, and the loyal and devoted Polish government in exile in London.
The Kremlin's treatment of the Poles, beginning in the spring of 1943, was the touchstone of this whole period, and it was at the Quebec Conference that the whole dangerous policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was forecast and prefigured. At Quebec the decision was made to invade Southern France and keep the weakened American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army indecisively engaged in Italy. It was at Quebec also that the most amazing and indicative document that has so far emerged from the voluminous records of World War II was brought to bear. This document, a memorandum entitled "Russia's position," affords us clear insight into our subsequent surrenders at Tehran and Yalta as well as at Potsdam. The document appears, and only there, in Sherwood's book about Hopkins. It is on page 748. The memorandum is ascribed there to "a very-high-level United States military strategic estimate." Sherwood reports that Hopkins had it with him at Quebec. Can it be doubted that this document emanated from General Marshall, whoever drafted it? The question of its authorship is extremely important and I hope that some day its authorship will be fixed for all to see.
No document of World War II was more controlling on our fate. Here it is in full:
Russia's postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-a-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported.
The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance, and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.
Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive.
Sherwood understood the memorandum's significance. He wrote, "This estimate was obviously of great importance as indicating the policy which guided the making of decisions at Tehran and, much later, at Yalta." What this document is, in effect, is a 19 rationalization of the whole policy of submission to Russia during the remainder of World War II and, most notably, in our relationships with China thereafter. What it said was that as a result of the utter destruction of Germany which we had erected into a policy at Casablanca with the phrase "unconditional surrender," Russia would be the unquestioned "top dog" in Europe after the war, and that it behooved the great, enlightened, and truly progressive English-speaking peoples therefore to cater to, to placate, and, in fact, to submit to the will of the Kremlin thereafter. It said unmistakably that the British endeavors in the Mediterranean, which Marshall had succeeded in blocking, were aimed at balancing power in Europe vis-a-vis Russia.
That is bad enough. But the document went further. It insisted that we must carry this attitude of solicitude and deference beyond Europe. We must bow to Russia in the Far East as well. It is here that we find the first explicit delineation of the policy which produced the shameful betrayal of China at Yalta, the blackmail paid by Roosevelt to get Russia into a war which she had already announced her eagerness to wage.
The debate over Mediterranean policy had reached a focus at the White House late in May of 1943 when Churchill again crossed the Atlantic in pursuit of a common objective. He found that Marshall was opposed to any action in the Mediterranean beyond taking Sardinia after the occupation of Sicily, and that then all of our subsequent efforts were to be devoted to what the late Sir John Dill, who was Chief of the British Military Mission in Washington, once referred to in a letter to Churchill as "Marshall's first love" - the trans-channel invasion. Roosevelt was pulled and hauled on this issue as much as on any in the war. His inclinations, based upon his knowledge of geography and his adventurous strategic desires, were toward expanding the war into eastern Europe. Ultimately, however, Roosevelt went along with Marshall.
So determined was Churchill at the White House in May to have his views prevail that he induced Roosevelt to send Marshall with him to North Africa for a further discussion with military leaders in that theater. I gather from The Hinge of Fate that it was at this point that Churchill realized that his great antagonist in the war was Marshall, that he and Marshall were virtually contending for the mastery of their views over the impulsive will of the President. It was in connection with that journey by Churchill and Marshall to North Africa that the Prime Minister wrote in The Hinge of Fate, pages 812 and 813, a tribute to the general as a "statesman with a penetrating and commanding view of the whole scene." It may be noted that Churchill did not ascribe to Marshall a correct and trustworthy view of the whole scene and it may be wondered, in the light of their great conflicts, whether the Prime Minister was not perhaps indulging his rather frequent taste for irony.
In Tunis, Churchill brought to bear upon Marshall and Eisenhower, who invariably sided with Marshall, the whole battery of persuasion of himself and his military subordinates. The views of the British were made more persuasive by the fact that they had carried the major burden of the war in North Africa. Marshall resisted, remaining, as Churchill comments, "up 'til almost the last minute, silent or cryptic." The upshot was that Marshall insisted upon deferring the decision until Sicily had been made secure and "the situation in Russia known." The quotation is from Churchill's report of the conference.
We recur to the Quebec Conference of August 14, as Admiral Leahy reports it on page 175 of his book:
General Marshall was very positive in his attitude against a Mediterranean commitment.
Churchill did, however, temporarily prevail, and we invaded Italy; but Marshall and Stalin won out in the end when Roosevelt sided with them at Tehran, where there was thrown away the advantage of the Italian campaign . We are indebted to Mr. Sherwood for the fullest account of the Stalin position at Tehran. This account was obtained, of course, from Hopkins's oral and written recollections. At one point, quoted on page 780 of Sherwood's book, Stalin urged that the "entry of Turkey into the war - a development to which Churchill was passionately committed, and which the Russians had been previously urging - might be helpful in opening the way to the Balkans, but the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and the only direct way of striking at that heart was through France." Here Roosevelt suggested that it might be useful if the Americans and British marched east in conjunction with Tito's Partisans into Romania and joined with the Reds at Odessa. Stalin inquired if that would affect the thirty-five divisions earmarked for the trans-channel invasion of France. Churchill replied that it would not. Sherwood comments, however, that "nothing could be further from the plans of the United States Chief of Staff." It was then that Stalin brought his powerful guns to bear to conclude the controversy. I am quoting from Sherwood-and he wrote:
Stalin then expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to scatter forces in various operations through the eastern Mediterranean. He said The Struggle for Eastern Europe he thought Overlord (the name given to the cross-channel invasion) should be considered the basis of all operations in 1944 and that after the capture of Rome, the forces used there should be sent into southern France to provide a diversionary operation in support of Overlord. He even felt that it might be better to abandon the capture of Rome altogether, leaving 10 divisions to hold the present line in Italy and using the rest of the Allied forces for the invasion of southern France. He said it had been the experience of the Red army that it was best to launch an offensive from two converging directions, forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. Therefore, he favored simultaneous operations in northern and southern France, rather than the scattering of forces in the eastern Mediterranean.
We may be sure that Stalin's didactic observations fell upon Marshall's ears with the authority of revelation . It was made abundantly evident at Tehran that Marshall had earned the warm approval of Stalin. On page 783 of the Sherwood record, the author notes that both Stalin and Voroshilov obviously recognized Marshall as the supreme advocate of Overlord and therefore their friend.
Sherwood notes that after Marshall had discussed the difficulties of Overlord , Voroshilov turned to him and said admiringly, "If you think about it, you will do it."
On page 791, in discussing the moot question at that time of who was to command Overlord, Sherwood repeats a report that Stalin, in discussions with Roosevelt, made evident his conviction that "no wiser or more reassuring choice" than Marshall could be made.
It is noteworthy that the brusque, cynical Stalin exhibited fondness for no other American at Tehran with the single exception of Hopkins, with whom he had a personal acquaintance dating from Hopkins's visit to Moscow in August of 1941 upon an errand which must have gratified the tyrant's heart. It was then that Hopkins offered the bountiful support of the United States to the Kremlin's resistance of the Nazi invaders without stint, quid pro quo, or any reservations whatsoever.
General "Hap" Arnold
General "Hap" Arnold, who was not present at Tehran because of illness, himself commented on the reports as he received them. His comments will be found on page 465 of Global Mission. Said Arnold:
Apparently Uncle Joe had talked straight from the shoulder about how to carry on the war against Germany, and his ideas, it seems, were much more in accord with the American ideas than with those of the British.
Admiral Leahy, who was there, adds his comment after giving his own version of the Stalin speech I have quoted from Sherwood. He wrote, and this is on page 204 of his book:
The Soviets and Americans seemed to be nearly in agreement as to the fundamental strategic principles that should be followed.
Tehran took place in November and December of 1943. The projected invasion of southern France was given the name Anvil. Although Churchill and his advisers continued to fight for the eastern operation, it was manifestly a losing struggle. Churchill himself employed his stormy eloquence on Mark Clark, as that great American general was fighting his way up the Italian peninsula, assuring Clark that, given his way, the Western Powers could "slit this soft under-belly of the Axis." The Prime Minister was pursuing a lost cause. After the capture of Rome, the Fifth Army which had become, as Clark proudly asserts, "a tremendous fighting machine" with "horizons unlimited," was disrupted. Over Clark's strong protests, he lost the Sixth Corps and seven crack French divisions, all withdrawn for Anvil, Clark was compelled to abandon his drive to the Po, giving Kesselring respite, a decision that puzzled the German high command, as we were to discover after their surrender. Writes Clark on page 371 of Calculated Risk: "It was a decision that was likely to puzzle historians for a much longer time." In considering his impression of that period when he sat down to write his memoirs after the war, Clark says, on page 368:
Stalin, it was evident throughout the Big Three meeting and negotiations at Tehran, was one of the strongest boosters of the invasion of southern France. He knew exactly what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans, which he had staked out for the Red Army. If we switched our strength from Italy to France, it was obvious to Stalin that we would turn away from central Europe. Anvil led into a dead-end street. It was easy to see why Stalin favored Anvil at Tehran and why he kept right on pushing for it.
I come to a most significant passage which deals specifically with what lay before Clark and was denied him by Marshall in collaboration with Stalin. Says Clark:
After the fall of Rome, Kesselring's army could have been destroyed if we had been able to shoot the works in a final offensive. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia and beyond Yugoslavia were Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.
At this point may I remind you that wherever the Russian armies came to rest, there they stayed and there they remain to this day. The Red armies have not relinquished one inch of the soil upon which they stood at the defeat of Germany. General Clark continues:
There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British mind, but so far as I ever found out, American top-level planners were not interested. It was generally understood that President Roosevelt toyed with the idea for a while but was not encouraged by Harry Hopkins. After the fall of Rome, we "ran for the wrong goal," both from a political and strategical standpoint.
Clark has, moreover, a superior vantage point from which to judge the consequences because he served with the utmost distinction as the American military governor of Vienna after the war. It was there that he felt the iron determination of Soviet imperialism to prevail over eastern Europe. It was there that he had ample opportunity to consider how differently things might have been had we proceeded east from the valley of the Po instead of turning our forces into the trivial and wholly unnecessary operations in southern France. General Clark concludes on page 3 of his book, and I here summon him as the most highly qualified witness in this matter:
Yet, I believe our mission was fulfilled and, save for a high-level blunder that turned us away from the Balkan states and permitted them to fall under Red Army control, the Mediterranean campaign might have been the most decisive of all in postwar history.
At another place, expressing his frustration over the enfeeblement of his campaign in Italy- and this is on page 368-Clark writes:
The Struggle for Eastern Europe A campaign that might have changed the whole history of the relationships between the Western World and Soviet Russia was permitted to fade away. The weakening of the campaign in Italy was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war.
Where, until President Truman's appointment of this great General to the nonmilitary post of Ambassador to the Vatican, at this writing not yet confirmed, was Mark Clark, a man pronounced in his military prime, a man of great achievement in Italy and of outstanding political and diplomatic accomplishment in Austria? After his return home from Vienna, General Clark was consistently relegated to secondary commands.
So also is this true of General Wedemeyer, likewise in his prime, likewise a soldier of great brilliance and great devotion to his country. Both Wedemeyer and Clark dared to oppose the judgment of General Marshall in his history-making decisions, Clark in Europe, Wedemeyer in Asia.
Where is Lucius Clay? Like MacArthur and Clark, a great proconsul; young as generals go, brilliant and steadfast in devotion not to party but to country. Clay insisted on resisting the Russians at Berlin.
The lessons must be plain as a pikestaff to the military leaders of our establishment. A prudent officer, looking forward to his continued career and his pension, certainly has to think twice before he expresses an objective and disinterested opinion of strategy or of the conduct of our military operations.
General MacArthur is not the only monument to the determination of Marshall to rule our politico-military policies now as he ruled our policies in World War II.
Major-General John R. Dean
The evidence is overwhelming that at Tehran we had no political policy. It so appears in the recollections of Major-General John R. Deane. After observing, on page 43 of his book The Strange Alliance, that "Stalin advocated the American point of view in our differences with Britain" and again that "Stalin's 'position' coincided with that of the American Chief of Staff and every word he said strengthened the support they might expect from President Roosevelt in the ultimate decision," Deane continues:
Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection on our President but his apparent indecision was probably a direct result of our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the Anglo-American forces in Western and southern Europe; Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved and British interests best served if the Anglo-Americans, as well as the Russians, participated in the occupation of the Balkans. From the political point of view, hindsight on our part points to foresight on Churchill's part.
The political immaturity of our generals, mentioned by Hanson Baldwin, was never so 'glaringly manifested as at Tehran if indeed, it was political immaturity and not the consequences of some hidden, and so far undisclosed, influence binding us to Stalin's world policy.
Could it be that, like children, our military advisers at Tehran dwelt only on the pleasures and tasks of the day with no thought for the morrow? Could they not envisage what was so clear to many other minds, that after the conclusion of hostilities the Soviet Union, conscious of its vast and violent world mission, might be ranged against us in every quarter of the globe? Or did Marshall and his supernumeraries on the Joint Chiefs at Tehran think of England instead of Russia as the future enemy?
Before quitting this question of the Marshall-Churchill conflict over the most important phases of the recent war, I shall cite another example of the ruthlessness with which Marshall prosecuted the rift. It should be noted that Churchill, who is an indomitable adversary in the House of Commons and elsewhere, fought on against Anvil long after his was a lost cause.
At Malta, where the Yalta conferees on the Anglo-American side met before proceeding to that Black Sea conference, the British chiefs still persisted in the hope of accomplishing some Mediterranean operations while preparing for the attack across the Channel. In Sherwood's book, page 848, is a revealing passage concerning those discussions of the combined chiefs:
The arguments reached such a point that Marshall, ordinarily one of the most restrained and soft spoken of men, announced that if the British plan were approved by the Prime Minister and the President, he would recommend to Eisenhower that he had no choice but to be relieved of his command.
Again, as in the case of the ultimatum over the "second front now," Marshall was threatening summary action unless his will prevailed. Why was it so important to Marshall that the British, as a full partner in the Anglo-American war effort, should be prevented from creating that balance of military power in the Mediterranean spoken of in the memorandum circulated by Hopkins at the first Quebec conference?
Before we proceed to other matters of political strategy, let us consider instances in the management of American military affairs in World War II where Marshall's actions operated directly against the interests of the United States.
General Deane is an uncommonly friendly witness for George Marshall. He was Marshall's protege, having served as secretary of the combined chiefs in Washington until Marshall sent him in the fall of 1943 to Moscow as chief of our military mission in Russia. It should be noted that we had withdrawn our military and naval attaches from Moscow because, in fulfilling the time-honored and expected duties of military attaches, they had aroused the resentment of the Kremlin. Those duties include discovering and reporting to the home government all information that can be obtained legitimately regarding the armed forces of the country to which the attaches are accredited . The information thus sought has to do with weapons, tactical programs, and methods, and the size, training, and disposition of that country's military forces.
Before General Deane departed for his mission in Moscow, he had a long interview with General Marshall, in which the Chief of Staff cautioned Deane to seek no information about these matters for fear that he might "irritate" the Russians. We were then devoting a substantial part of our military production to Russia's war effort, and doing so in entirely good faith. It was not long after General Deane reached Moscow that he began to be impressed with the extraordinary contrast between the Russian attitude and our own. This he describes on page 49 of his book:
We had thousands of Soviet representatives in the United States who were allowed to visit our manufacturing plants, attend our schools, and witness tests of aircraft and The Struggle for Eastern Europe other equipment. In Italy, and later in France and Germ any, Russian representatives were welcome at our field headquarters and allowed to see anything they desired of our military operations. Our policy was to make an y of our new inventions in electronics and other fields available to Russia each month I would receive a revised list of secret American equipment about which Russia could be informed in the hope that if it could be made available, it might be used on the Russian front. We never lost an opportunity to give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which we thought might help our combined war effort.
The head of the American military mission in Moscow encountered the Iron Curtain long before Churchill coined the phrase. Toward the end of the war, when our always excessive solicitude seemed to him no longer warranted, he advised a more resolute attitude toward the Russians. Each time he suggested that we demand a fulfillment of an agreement and they broke virtually every agreement we made with them, he was called off in Washington. By whom? Deane's reports went directly to General Marshall.
Why have we not had, and do not have at this moment , an American, or at least an allied, corridor to Berlin? Why are we at the mercy of the Russians in our access to the joint capital of the occupying powers ? Why was it possible for the Russians to produce the blockade of Berlin with a simple set of instructions with which General Clay found it impossible, as a man of honor and a great American soldier, to comply ?
It has been the fashion to place the blame for this lack of foresight upon the late John G. Winant. As our Ambassador to London he sat on the European Advisory Commission, which worked out under the direction of the respective governments the zoning of Germany for occupation purposes. Winant cannot answer our questions now. General Clay, in his report on his great career as the American governor in Germany, Decision in Germany, accepts the version that shoulders the blame onto Winant. Subsequently, on page 26, he him self takes the final blame. He was in Berlin in late June of 1945 arranging with Marshall Zhukov for the entry of American forces into their occupation position in Berlin.
The Russians were, as usual, hard to deal with. Clay was eager to get his occupation going and to have American forces on guard in Berlin . Instead of pressing the matter of a corridor under American rule, guarded by American troops, with supply and communication beyond the reach of Russian interference, he accepted an oral understanding with Zhukov that nothing would ever occur to impede American access to Berlin. Our zonal border , it will be recalled, had been set at a distance of 100 miles from Berlin.
The legend which saddled the late Winant with the responsibility for this tragic blunder in postwar arrangements has been vigorously challenged by Hanson Baldwin, who fixes the responsibility not on Winant but squarely on the War Department. "War Department" at that time meant George Catlett Marshall. From the fall of 1939 until the fall of 1946, Marshall was, in effect, the War Department. I cannot find in Mr. Stimson's memoirs any occasion on which he opposed the will of General Marshall.
On page 47 of Baldwin's book, he expresses his conviction that "the blame for Berlin cannot be laid-exclusively, or even to a major degree - upon the shoulders of Winant." Two pages later, in reviewing the background of this deplorable situation, Baldwin notes that the State Department at the end of 1943 proposed that the zones of postwar occupation "be so drawn as to bring each into contact with Berlin." I hasten to add that Cordell Hull,not Marshall or Dean Acheson- was then the Secretary of State.[And it was State that was overrun with communists!,so I am not sure Baldwin has his sources straight on this assertion DC]
I go on with Baldwin:
For some reason that defies logical understanding now, the War Department rejected this suggestion, which would have solved nearly all our postwar Berlin difficulties, so that it was never even broached in the EAC.
In February 1944, the British informally suggested that a corridor to Berlin be established and defined, but the War Department again objected, stating that this was not a subject for the EAC, but that the entire question of access to Berlin was a military matter which should be settled at the proper time by military representatives.
And this eventually was the solution, but the military representatives made a botch of it. In May 1945 our allies stood deep on German soil. The zonal occupation agreements for Germany placed Berlin in the Russian zone In May 1945 ECA's work was done and SCAEF was briefed as to its accomplishments.
The military were told the history of the problem. They were told that the War Department had blocked any consideration of it by EAC and were advised that the EA C staff believed we should have an indisputably American corridor under our own military supervision and guard. As we have seen, neither Marshall nor Eisenhower made provision for a corridor; General Clay concluded his improvised agreement with Zhukov, and the fat was in the fire.
Why did the War Department, meaning Marshall, leave us at the America's Retreat From Victory mercy of the Russians in Berlin? Why did not our forces march first into Berlin ? Why was General Patton not allowed to take Prague? We have only glimpses of the inner reality behind these questions. We gather from General Bradley's memoirs that Eisenhower's decision not to reach Berlin first was conditioned to some extent by the flagrant quarrel that had arisen between Bradley and General Montgomery. In his version of the matter, appearing on page 69 of Life magazine for April 30, 1951, Bradley relates a discussion with Eisenhower wherein it was decided not to allow Montgomery the forces with which to push on to Berlin. Eisenhower was principally concerned at the moment lest the armies of Russia and the English-speaking powers should meet in a head-on collision somewhere in Germany. I quote Bradley on how Eisenhower solved the problem :
Five days before Hodges and Simpson closed their trap around the Ruhr, Eisenhower radioed Stalin through the United States Military Mission in Moscow of his plan to push east with a powerful force in the center to the line of the Elbe.
The Elbe line was where Eisenhower proposed to Stalin that he would bring the American armies to rest. Eisenhower fixed this highly important point, be it noted, with Stalin . It is clear from Bradley's recollections that Eisenhower acted on this highly political question without consulting with Churchill. Whether he consulted Roosevelt and Marshall is not mentioned by Bradley. Certainly he must have consulted Marshall. I continue to quote Bradley:
Although Churchill protested Eisenhower's radio to Moscow as an unwarranted intrusion by the military into a political problem, he reserved his angriest vituperation for the plan Eisenhower proposed. The Yalta Sellout The Prime Minister, according to Eisenhower, was greatly disappointed and disturbed that SCAEF had not reinforced Montgomery with American troops and pointed him toward Berlin in a desperate [sic] effort to capture that city before the Russians took it.
We gain another bit of insight into this situation-which provides a somewhat more startling example of command discretion than any displayed by MacArthur in Japan-from Edward Ansel Mowrer in his book The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy, in which he relates having been personally told by the White House that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, meant Marshall.
We have been reviewing General Marshall's record as it applies to the war in Europe with an eye to his competence and the extent to which he backed up Stalin in political decisions. The Democrats in Denver proclaimed him "a master of global strategy." The term, of course, implies much more than purely military planning. As we have seen, when you reach the upper levels of command inhabited during the recent war by Marshall, Churchill, and Roosevelt, the military decisions blend everywhere with the political. They cannot be dissociated. A war is not conducted merely as a means of killing the enemy, although during the late war Mr. Roosevelt expressed so much joy over Russia's accomplishments in that line that it might be questioned if he always understood the nature of war. We have seen recently in Korea where, beggared of any respectable and intelligent war purpose, our forces were led to believe from Marshall's testimony that the only objective of that war was to kill the enemy. I put aside the ethical considerations raised by such an attitude and point out that the enemy's extermination is not enough. Of course, it is necessary to have the enemy's submission. But, also, great powers must have some understanding of what that submission portends and what they intend to do with the world over which they will exercise sway once the enemy is defeated.
We have observed what calamities might have befallen the allied cause had Roosevelt accepted Marshall's persistent demand for a "second front now ." We have seen the equivocal and dangerous nature of his counsel with reference to the North African invasion. We have observed how closely he fitted his views into those of Stalin over every major issue of the war. We have seen further how, in his instructions to General Deane, his refusal to exercise foresight over the corridor to Berlin, and his wish that the Russians might first enter that great and shattered city, General Marshall's decisions paralleled the interests of the Kremlin.
The Democrats at Denver may have been correct in their appraisal of General Marshall's attainments as a strategist. The question that arises, after examining the facts we have enumerated and those we shall enumerate, is, in whose interest did he exercise his genius? If he was wholeheartedly serving the cause of the United States, these decisions were great blunders. If they followed a secret pattern to which we do not as yet have the key, they may very well have been successful in the highest degree.
The Yalta Sellout
We turn now to the Pacific side of the recent global war and an examination of General Marshall's behavior in that vast theater.
First, we must consider what went on at Yalta. If, as Hanson Baldwin observes, we lost the peace because of great political mistakes in World War II, then it is clear that those mistakes culminated in the controlling decisions made at the conferences of Tehran and Yalta. It is my judgment that we lost the peace in Europe at Tehran. It is even clearer that we lost the peace in Asia at Yalta . At Tehran, Marshall's will prevailed in concert with that of Stalin regarding the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. At Yalta, Marshall's will prevailed, with that of Stalin, regarding Russia's entry into the far Eastern war as a full-fledged partner entitled to the spoils of such participation.
Yalta is a former resort of the Romanoff Czars on the shores of the Black Sea. Yalta is where Roosevelt, already suffering from the enfeeblement that brought his death four months later, went to meet again with the bloody autocrat of all the Russians and the Churchill with whom he had signally differed at Teheran.
The President, bearing the marks of his approaching dissolution, traveled the thousands of weary miles by plane, by ship, and, at the end, by motorcar, to treat with the tyrant, to seek accord with him, and to make the bargains over Poland and China that today plague and shame us all. The principal, the most utterly damaging, of these bargains contained the bribe he paid to Stalin for his eleventh-hour participation in the war against Japan.
Manchuria is the richest part of China . In terms of 'area and natural resources it may described as the Texas of China. But Manchuria has not been China's to en joy for many years. It must be recalled, and this is a key to much of China's fearful history during the last generation, that the age-old empire of China came to its end in the years before World War 1. The causes of that event need not take up too much America's Retreat From Victory of our time. The imperial court, presided over by the aged dowager empress, was beset by western ideas, western-trained Chinese reformers, notably Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by the incompetence of the empress' advisers and by the conflicting and greedy claims of the Great Powers. And so it fell, and for a generation China has known neither peace nor freedom from foreign invasion.
Manchuria itself has been the scene and occasion of wars for more than half a century . Japan and Russia alike have fought for its mastery since the Sino/Japanese War of 1894. When, after that war, the Japanese were prevented by the European powers from enjoying the fruits of victory in Manchuria, Russia lunged down from the Maritime Provinces of Siberia to fill that vacuum.
By the year 1904, Japan felt strong enough to challenge Russia over Manchuria. That was what the Russo/Japanese War was about, a war in which Theodore Roosevelt backed Japan by deed and sentiment, out of fear of the growing might of Russia in eastern Asia. Theodore Roosevelt was solely pursuing American interest, and when he saw that Japan, if it won too conclusive a victory, might succeed to Russia's mantle and advance farther into China, Roosevelt intervened. He brought the Japanese and Russians together at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to negotiate a peace which checked Japanese ambitions even as it also ended Russian sway in Manchuria.
The intervening years saw a steady encroachment by Japan over Manchuria, an encroachment viewed with alarm by the single-minded Americans who then conducted our foreign policies, un til the climax was reached in 1937 when Japan launched full-scale war against China for undisputed control of Manchuria and northern China. The Yalta Sellout Korea, which is a geographical dependency of Manchuria, had, of course, been sacrificed to Japan's imperial ambitions along the route and had long since been integrated into the empire of Nippon.
The historic route of the invaders of China has been from the north . During many centuries, China has mounted guard on its northern frontiers against the peoples of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia, who have, for as many centuries, been regard ed as barbarians by the civilized Chinese. Manchuria has been the key to the security of China since the Manchu conquest nearly four centuries ago. This fact we should remember and consider, as we remember Yalta .
It was a rich, highly developed Manchuria that was at stake at Yalta. It was Manchuria which Franklin D . Roosevelt thrust upon the Russians ; it was, moreover, conferred upon the new barbarians with full understanding that the United States was thereby satisfying an old imperialistic design of the Kremlin. The very language of the secret protocol which sealed the bargain at Yalta recognized this fact. What Roosevelt ceded to Stalin at Yalta, with out the knowledge or consent of the Chinese, whose sovereignty there we always had upheld, was, and I quote from the work of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. , Roosevelt and the Russians, page 93, in restoration of "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904." The testimony before the Russell Committee shows that Chiang Kai-shek was not invited to the Yalta Conference and that the terms of the agreement selling out Chinese interests were kept secret from him. At the Cairo Conference, however, it was solemnly agreed with him that China's rights in Manchuria would be fully respected and protected. When Wedemeyer appeared before the Russell Committee, he testified that when Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek of the Yalta agreement which sealed the doom of the Republic of China, Chiang was so shocked that he asked Hurley to repeat it before he could believe it.
The project was not disguised . It was a nakedly imperialistic aggression over the prostrate body of China. What Roosevelt sealed and delivered in the protocol agreed upon by him and Stalin in a secret parley consuming only eleven minutes, and thereafter kept locked away in a White House safe for man y months, we re the historic levers of power over China-the ports of Darien and Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. It was through these ports and along those railways, with their armed guards and command of all the communications, including the telegraph lines, that first Russia, then Japan, and now again Russia, with her satellite, exercised mastery over Manchuria.
According to the terms of the bribe, drawn up in Moscow by that elusive statesman of the half world in which our relations with Russia dwell, Averell Harriman, Dairen was to be "internationalized," the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union being safeguarded, and "the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored." I have quoted from the protocol as published by Stettinius. I again quote:
The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet/Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.
There were other provisions. Russia's 30 long-standing protectorate over Outer Mongolia was ratified, the southern end of Sakhalin, of which Russia was deprived by the treaty of Portsmouth, was restored to her, and, as if to boot, the Kuriles were handed her. The Kuriles had been Japanese, never Russian.
What shall we say of Roosevelt's cynical submission to Russian imperialism in that deal? This was the Roosevelt, mark you, who is represented to us in Sumner Welles's book Seven Decisions That Shaped History, as the high-principled opponent of imperialism in Hong Kong and India. This is the Roosevelt who steadfastly through the war sought to persuade Churchill to get out of India and surrender the British leasehold of Hong Kong. This was the Roosevelt who proposed to Stalin at Yalta-and I find this in Sherwood on page 866-that Hong Kong be handed to the Chinese or internationalized and that colony turned over to a United Nations trusteeship. This was the Roosevelt who suggested that French Indochina be placed under a trusteeship. He broached this idea to Sumner Welles.
What does this whole sordid transaction teach us about the good faith of the advisers of Roosevelt and the assorted liberals, Communists, Communist sympathizers, and agents of the Kremlin - the Acheson's, the Lattimores, the Phillip Jessups, and the Institute of Pacific Relations[known front for the CFR DC] , who have for so long been insincerely befuddling the people with talk of imperialism and people's rights in Asia?
Why, merely this, that in their minds the imperialism of the west, that decaying instrument of European expansion, is wicked and must be opposed. The imperialism of Russia is not only commendable but must be advanced by every means of diplomacy and war at whatever cost to the United States.
That is the liberal-leftist doctrine on imperialism. Have we heard one liberal voice raised in the Senate or elsewhere in condemnation of Roosevelt's surrender to Russian imperialism at Yalta? This is the test, and by it we may measure the monstrous hypocrisy of the liberal elements in Congress and in the country which have assisted in and applauded the surrender of all China to Russia without the firing of a single Russian shot.[And still to this day the lame stream liberal media plays up the McCarthy deal as an incident of persecution and mock it as though he was a paranoid conspiracy freak.Well there is far to much evidence pointing towards McCarthy being spot on in his accusations for everyone to sit back and except the lying narrative of those who sold us out, and I do not, and will not except their word on these matters DC]
The apologists for Mr. Roosevelt have attempted to palliate his offense. Robert Sherwood suggests that Roosevelt was enfeebled. I quote him: "Had it not been that the Yalta Conference was almost at an end arid he was tired and anxious to avoid further argument," Roosevelt, in his opinion, might have refused to sign the protocol. This is on page 867 of Roosevelt and Hopkins. Yet on the preceding page he nullifies the argument of fatigue by conceding:
It is quite clear that Roosevelt had been prepared even before the Teheran conference in 1943 to agree to the legitimacy of most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far East, for they involved the restoration of possessions and privileges taken by the Japanese from the Russians in the war of 1904.
And Sherwood elsewhere reports Roosevelt offering Stalin the "warm water port" of Dairen as early as Tehran. Mr. Sherwood is known as a fervent and practicing "liberal." He sees nothing wrong in restoring the imperialistic "possessions and privileges" which had been wrested from a dying Chinese empire by the forces of Czarism. The insincerity, the speciousness, the non logical workings of the liberal mind when it comes to Russian ambitions are clearly manifested by Mr. Sherwood. Mr. Welles presents a better case. He, too, is a "liberal," but with a higher sense of responsibility to The Yalta Sellout history. I need not introduce Mr. Welles to the reader. He served in the Department of State until the fall of 1943, when his long-standing feud with Cordell Hull brought about the termination of his public service. Mr. Welles was Under Secretary of State when dismissed. His book Seven Decisions That Shaped History is 'an apologia for his late chief, Roosevelt, and a justification for certain events in his own career.
Mr. Well es insists that Roosevelt's betrayal of China and the United States at Yalta is excusable. O n what ground ? The ground of military necessity. When Roosevelt acted, according to Welles, he did so because he believed that we mu st entice Stalin into committing what we see as a plain act of self-interest, namely, getting into the war against Japan before it was too late. The President made that judgment because he had been advised by his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that we had a long, hard row to hoe with the Japanese and th at without Russia's help we might not achieve victory.
That is the Welles doctrine. It is likewise the Marshall-Acheson-State Department line . Where Welles differs is that he exposes that the military advice upon which Roosevelt acted was false and misleading. And where does the pursuit of this rationalization lead us?
As we might suppose-to Marshall.
It was Marshall who stood at Roosevelt's elbow at Yalta, urging the grim necessity of bribing Stalin to get into the war. It was Marshall who submitted intelligence reports to support his argument, suppressing more truthful estimates, according to Hanson Baldwin on page 81, and keeping from the stricken Roosevelt knowledge that the Japanese were even then feeling for peace in acknowledgment of defeat.
Was this a sincere endeavor by the master of global strategy to advance American interest? Did we sorely need Russian assistance? Or was it another in the baffling pattern of General Marshall's interventions in the course of the great war which conduced to the well-being of the Kremlin?
The desire to have Russia's help in the Far East arose with Marshall and was embodied, as we know, in the fateful appeasement memorandum of the first Quebec conference in August of 1943; the document which charted our course, at Tehran and Yalta and thereafter. The desire to entice Russia into the Japanese war was officially embodied in a combined Chiefs of Staff doctrine which I have previously discussed and which was presented at second Quebec, in September of 1944. Back in the fall of 1943 the President sent Averell Harriman to Moscow as his Ambassador and Marshall sent General Deane, their "prime objective," as Deane describes it on page 25 of his book, being "to induce Soviet participation in the war with Japan."
Were inducements necessary? Was it in the Kremlin 's interest to become a full-fledged combatant in the war in the Far East, to take part in the defeat of Japan and have a seat at the peace table where the spoils of war would be divided ? Was it to the Kremlin's interest to march its armies into Manchuria, from which they had been barred since 1905 by the Kwantung army, and to be in possession the re when the war ended? If some Americans did not grasp the strategic importance of Manchuria, there is certainly abundant evidence that the Kremlin, faithful to Lenin's dictum that "he who controls China controls the world," never lost sight of it. To ask these questions is to answer them, even if we lacked the indications of Stalin's determination to be in at the Far Eastern kill, which we have. Any intelligent American, after giving the matter sufficient thought,would know that the aim of Roosevelt and Marshall at Yalta should have been not how to get the Russians in, but how to keep th em out.
I have evidence of four occasions before Yalta on which Stalin indicated to American officials his desires in this respect. The first such suggestion was made to Averell Harriman when, in August of 1942, he went to Moscow with Churchill to deliver the word that the operations in North Africa had been substituted for the second front now so exigently demanded by Stalin and Marshall. The occasion is reported by General Deane on page 226 of his book :
Stalin told Harriman then that Japan was the historic enemy of Russia and that her eventual defeat was essential to Russian interests. He implied that while the Soviet Union's military position at that time would not permit her participation, eventually she would come In.
Roosevelt knew of this : so, presumably, did Marshall. It should be noted th at Stalin ascribed Russian interests as his motive for fighting Japan.
The Red Czar next informed General Patrick J. Hurley of his intentions. And in April of 1943 Hurley so reported to Admiral Leahy. The reference is on page 147 of Leahy's book, and I quote him:
Hurley saw Stalin and the Marshal told him that after Germany was defeated, he would assist America in the war against Japan. The [our] army, in its plans for the defeat of Japan, was anxious to have the help of Russia. It was my opinion that we could defeat Japan without Russian assistance.
The stouthearted old sea dog Leahy held to that opinion through out, being overborne always by Marshall. The history of the war in the Far East and our postwar loss of China, with the resultant war in Korea, would have been far different had Leahy been, as his rank prescribed, the principal military adviser to Roosevelt. That was not to be. The iron will of Marshall prevailed over Leahy, as it did over Roosevelt and, after the invasion of Italy, over Churchill.
I digress to report the substance of Leahy's opposition to asking the Russians in, because it bears so pertinently on the issue and because Leahy's qualifications were so high, his reasoning so soundly American. In the record of World War II, where Leahy occupies an honorable place, no question can arise at any time as to where his loyalties lie.
In the strategical discussions about how to end the war with Japan , Marshall urged that a land invasion was necessary; an invasion beginning in the southern islands of the Japanese homelands and proceeding north; an invasion requiring upward of 2,000,- 000 riflemen and entailing, according to Marshall's estimates, casualties of half a million.
Leahy reports a conference at the White House on the 10th of July, 1944. This is on page 245 of his book. Wrote Leahy:
It was my opinion, and I urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that no major land invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war.
Far more impelling even than Leahy's own judgment was the agreement he reported, page 251, between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz' at Honolulu on that point. Leahy accompanied Roosevelt, it will be recalled, on that excursion, which coincided with the Democratic National Convention of 1944. He attended the The Yalta Sellout conversations at which the President and the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific projected victory over Japan. These-Nimitz and MacArthur -were the true experts on the Pacific. Let us have their judgment and Leahy's conclusions thereon:
The agreement on fundamental strategy to be employed in defeating Japan and the President's familiarity with the situation acquired at this conference were to be of great value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Department were advocating, regardless of the loss of life that would result from an attack on Japan's ground forces in their own country. MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the western Pacific and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.
There we have the strategy of MacArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy for winning the war in the Pacific-but not Marshall's. Who was right?
Yet, despite this expert advice, Marshall persisted. At the staff discussions before second Quebec, two months later, Leahy had this to report on page 259:
By the beginning of September, Japan was almost defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade. However, a proposal was made by the Army to force a surrender of Japan by an amphibious invasion of the main islands through the island of Kyushu. The Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan. The Army not only was planning a huge land invasion of Japan, but was convinced that we needed Russian assistance as well to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion.
So much for the strategy of the matter.
I return to the indications of Russia's intentions in the Far East. Cordell Hull was the unexpected and extremely gratified recipient of the third such proffer of help in the Far East. The venerable Secretary of State, an upright and proud man, although he did not wholly understand the currents of high policy that swirled about him, went to Moscow in October of 1943 to attend a conference of the Allied foreign ministers. It was a momentous occasion for Mr. Hull, the crowning accomplishment of a lifetime devoted to public service. At that time Mr. Hull suffered from the current credulity about Russia's good faith in the highest American circles. He was insisting, to the annoyance of subtler minds, that Russia was one nation, Britain another, equal in merit as in menace, and that we must treat them with equal and exact consideration. A fair-spoken man himself, Mr. Hull assumed that he was dealing with men of like scruple.[It is quite clear he was not,at best he was dealing with a bunch of ambitious Internationalists or worse,a cell of communists that has penetrated the United States government at it's high level,or a combination of the two DC]
On the final night of his stay in Moscow, Mr. Hull attended the usual state banquet with which the master of the Kremlin regales his visitors. The banquet took place in the Hall of Catherine the Great at the Kremlin. They dined upon the gold plate and drank innumerable toasts from heavy crystal.
Mr. Hull felt himself honored at being on the right of the prime author of world misfortune. After having suitably flattered Stalin, Hull was "astonished and delighted" when the Marshall turned to him and said, as recorded on page 1309 of Mr. Hull's Memoirs :
clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies had succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan. Stalin had brought up this subject entirely on his own. He finished by saying that I could inform President Roosevelt of this in the strictest confidence. I thanked him heartily.
The Secretary of State lost no time in cabling the promise to Roosevelt, using both the Army and Navy ciphers in the hope of keeping the news from the British. It was Mr. Hull's belief, a belief too often verified, that the Foreign Office in London leaked secrets.
In his reflections over Yalta-Hull had by then resigned-he seemed to think it passing strange that Roosevelt had had to acquire Stalin's assistance by means of "numerous territorial concessions." He added, "When Stalin made his promise to me it had no strings attached to it."
The fourth assurance from Stalin regarding the Far East came at Tehran , where he observed that, once peace came in Europe, "by our common front we shall win" in that quarter. But by that time, recognizing that Harriman and Deane had come to Moscow to ply him for assistance, Stalin was, quite naturally, thinking of his price. The price was not cheap . In October of 1944, during Churchill's second visit to Moscow, Harriman got Stalin on the subject of the war against Japan . Deane noted, page 247 of his book, that Stalin agreed that
the Soviet Union would take the offensive after Germany's defeat, provided the United States would insist on building up the necessary reserve supplies (for 60 divisions in Siberia) and provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified. His latter proviso referred to the recognition by China of Russian claims against Japan in the Far East.
At this sitting Stalin agreed that the United States Navy might have Petropavlosk on the Pacific as a naval base and our air forces the sites for heavy bomber bases in the Maritime Provinces, but denied us use of the Trans-Siberian railroad to haul in supplies.
Thus was the gun pointed at Roosevelt's head. If we wanted Russia in, we had to supply her armies and force Chiang Kai-shek to accept the loss of Manchuria, which had been solemnly prom ised him by Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo. Marshall insisted, again beyond the call of duty, that we needed Russia. Roosevelt believed him. The cost of supplies was fairly heavy, the Russians stipulating what amounted to 860,410 tons of dry cargo, 206,000 tons of liquid cargo. .All this in addition to the supplies for the war in Europe called for under the fourth protocol. The Russians got 80 per cent of their Far Eastern requirements. One item was 25,000 tons of canned meat. That would provide at least 50,000,000 meat courses, at a pound each, for the Red soldiers.
I return to Yalta, where Stalin got his price in full, the conference which is described by Hanson Baldwin as "the saddest chapter in the long history of political futility which the war recorded ."
What was the war situation in the Pacific in January of 1945? Leyte was ours, the Japanese fleet was defeated, Manila fell during the Yalta Conference, Okinawa lay ahead, but the Air Force was daily raining destruction and fire on Japanese cities. General William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services was reporting from China that the Kwantung army had been dissipated and depleted. In any case, said the O.S.S, what was left could not be moved to the Japanese home islands because of the lack of shipping. Nor could the Japanese troops in China The Yalta Sellout be moved. Everywhere the story was the same. The Japanese merchant marine was beneath the sea. The blockade was strangling Japan. Admiral Leahy wrote on page 293 of his book concerning his own views of the situation at this time:
I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. Th e Army did not agree with me and Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with Stalin.
Hanson Baldwin, writing after the event, endorsed Leahy's conclusions, saying, on page 79 of his book:
At the time of Yalta, Japan was already beaten-not by the atomic bomb which had not yet been perfected, not by conventional bombing then just starting, but by attrition and blockade.
Yet, at Yalta, General Marshall redoubled his endeavors for Russia's entrance with all the indomitable persistence he had applied to the "second front now " and to blocking Mark Clark and the British over the eastern European strategy . The late Edward Stettinius, who, as Secretary of State, played a hand at Yalta, recalled on page 90 of Roosevelt and the Russians :
I knew at Yalta of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into the far-eastern war.[More honestly stated,he means LEADER, DC]
Before Stettinius left Washington he saw a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the State Department which said : "We desire Russia's entry at the earliest possible date."
In support of his urgent demand, Marshall used what Baldwin calls on page 80 of his book "a pessimistic intelligence estimate," which placed the strength of the Kwantung army in Manchuria at 700,000, a total of 2,000,000 Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland-"all first-rate troops and well trained," according to Marshall. Far worse than this, Baldwin exposes the fact that more realistic intelligence estimates, corresponding to the facts as brought out after the war and held at that time by Leahy and others, "never reached the top echelon at Yalta." Even the Washington Post, that pillar of leftism and scuttle in Asia, felt moved on September 9, 1948, to declare that the Chiefs of Staff "made a blunder, to advise Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta that Japan would last 18 months after VE-day."
Nor is this the end of this dismal story.[You can say that again,here we are 64 years later, and you got folks in America screaming about a coming new world order, and they do not have a clue that this 'new order' HAD its beginning in the immediate aftermath of WW II,and continues to perfect itself right in front of our noses. DC]
Rear Admiral E. M. Zacharias, in his book Behind Closed Doors, declares that a Japanese peace feeler had been received and transmitted to Washington by General MacArthur before Roosevelt departed for Yalta . So at the time we sold out China to Russia to induce Russia to come into th e Japanese war, we already had Japan suing for peace, according to Admiral Zacharias. The peace overtures were to come thick and fast from Japanese sources after Yalta, and by the time of Potsdam they were so authentic that the Declaration of Potsdam was put forward to answer them.
Yet, late in April of 1945 Marshall was still intent upon wooing the Russians into the Far Eastern war. As Stettinius reports it on page 97:
At a top-level policy meeting in the White House just before the San Francisco conference opened on April 25 , President Truman, the military leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans. At this meeting the United States military representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crack-down would endanger Russian en try into the far-eastern war.
Who advised patience with Russia? Marshall ? At Potsdam, in July, Marshall's determination to have the Red Army equipped by us and moved into Asia had not abated. Stettinius reports with some perplexity on page 98:
Even as late as the Potsdam conference, after the first atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos on July 16, the military insisted that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the far-eastern war.
In his endeavor to exculpate Roosevelt of blame for the shame of Yalta, Welles saddles the blame on the combined Chiefs of Staff. We know that it was Marshall who formed and carried through those decisions. Welles attributed Marshall's desire to have Russia in to "a basic misapprehension of existing facts." This appears on page 153 of his book.
Is that the answer? Or was Marshall's insistence that Russia should be allowed to serve her own interest-not ours-in eastern Asia a part of that pattern which has been emerging with ever greater clarity as we trace his career: a pattern which finds his decisions, maintained with great stubbornness and skill, always and invariably serving the world policy of the Kremlin ?[I see significance in him using the word world instead of Foreign here DC]
The President had another adviser at Yalta, Alger Hiss. Was it upon the advice of Hiss, who served on the Far Eastern desks and was deep in the China plot, that Roosevelt, chatting companionably with Stalin, assured him that "the blame for the breach [in China] lay more with the Cornintern and the Kuomintang than the rank and file of the so-called Communists?" The quotation is from page 868 of Sherwood's revelatory book. It will be noted that the Communists, the Kremlin lackeys who sent their armies against our own in Korea, were to Roosevelt only "so-called" Communists, and pretty good fellows at that, more reasonable, the President may have gone on to say, than Chiang Kai-shek's bunch or even your own fellows, Generalissimo, in Moscow! We shall encounter that view of the Chinese Reds as agreeable innocents again when we examine Marshall's mission to China.
Let me assume for the moment that Marshall's judgment in World War II was cloud ed by no ulterior objective, no hidden thread of purpose which could not reach the light of day. What kind of a "master of global strategy" would have made the mistake of Yalta ? What kind of strategic genius does that display ? The whole array of Marshall's strategical endeavors, from Sledgehammer, or the "second front now," through his timidity over invading Algiers by way of the Mediterranean, to his downright insistence upon invading southern France two months after D-day in Normandy, is unreassuring. We inevitably contrast Marshall's competence with MacArthur's during MacArthur's grand march from Ne w Guinea to Tokyo. In the circumstances, how could we take Marshall 's word on strategy? If he so overestimated the Japanese as to believe they could fight on for a year and half after the Germans quit in Europe, how can we place any reliance upon his estimate of the strength of the Russian empire and its Chinese satellite in eastern Asia at this moment?
So the A-bombs fell on Japan and the war was over, although so careful a military critic as Hanson Baldwin believes that the bombs hastened the end of the war, if at all, by only one day. Japan's fate had been determined long, long before . And with the end of the The Yalta Sellout war Yalta's chickens came promptly home to roost. The Red Army after a bloodless campaign of six days took over all Manchuria; it stood also in North China. The Reds were there by right, ceded them at Yalta.
And so we come to the question of Korea. Who divided that unhappy land at the thirty- eighth parallel, ordering that Russia should receive the surrender of Japanese forces above that line, the United States below it ? Here we have one of the major mysteries of that time. At Yalta, Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt on a four-power trusteeship for Korea, the powers to be the United States, China, Russia, and Britain; a decision which he ratified when Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in the late spring of 1945. The trusteeship called for a unified administration of all Korea with a government of Koreans to be freely elected and governing the whole peninsula. W hat happened to the trusteeship ? When Japan quit, there arose the problem of accepting the surrender of the forces in the field.
Welles covers the situation on page 167 of his book Seven Decisions That Shaped History:
Some subordinate officers in the Pentagon hastily recommended that the Russians accept .the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, while the American troops would accept it south of that line.
I am told that this line was fixed because it was convenient. Certainly it was fixed by officials with no knowledge of what they were doing, and without consulting any responsible members of the administration who might have had some regard for the political and economic considerations which the decision so lamentably ignores.
There the matter rested until Senator Brewster of Maine brought to light the fact that the thirty-eighth parallel has historic significance. I had wondered why the W ar Department in August of 1945 chose to divide Korea for purposes, as was said, of receiving the Japanese surrender, along the thirty-eighth parallel. Why not the thirty-seventh, or the thirty-ninth parallel? Why had it to be the thirty-eighth parallel?
The Senator from Maine, in delving into United States Relations, which is the continuing history of American foreign affairs as published periodically by the Department of State, found that the Russians had fixed the thirty-eighth parallel, nearly a half century ago, as the dividing line. They were negotiating with Japan over the division of Korea between the two imperial systems. So the Czar's diplomats proposed to those of the Emperor of Japan that the thirty-eighth parallel be the border between the two empires.
I refer to the testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees on June 8, 1951, when Secretary Acheson was being questioned by Senator Brewster on this point . Acheson disclosed that the decision was taken not by "some subordinate officers" but by the Secretary of War, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee, and by the President. This was a high-level decision, initiated by the Secretary of War. Who was, in effect, the Secretary of War during the later incumbency of Mr. Stimson ? I think no one who was in touch with the inner workings of those adjoining offices at the Pentagon, who has read the late Secretary's explicit memoirs, who knows the inner relationships between the two men, can doubt that in matters of this sort it was Marshall who made the decisions, Stimson who rubber stamped them.
It was Marshall who selected the line for the division of Korea which was chosen by the Russian Foreign Office and General Staff nearly fifty years ago. It was Marshall who restored Russia's pre-1904 claims on North Korea in August of 1945.
I refer you particularly to this colloquy, the Senator from Maine asking, Secretary Acheson answering the questions :
SENATOR BREWSTER. Isn't it rather interesting to note the thirty eighth parallel in Korea was proposed 45 years earlier by Russia as a means of dividing the spheres of influence of Russia and J apan incident to the episodes around the Russo-Japanese War?
SECRETARY ACHESON. I am not familiar with that, Senator.
I content myself with noting that a Secretary of State unfamiliar with the complex of imperial ambitions in the Far East during the days when the United States was playing a humane, a creditable and an American part in those affairs can scarcely qualify as an expert on the diplomacy of the Far East.
The war was over. Millions of Americans, mistakenly thinking that their international troubles were over too, had a 24-hour celebration only to awaken before long to find that, even as we were spending vast amounts of flesh and blood and steel to win the war, there was being conducted what appeared to be a planned loss of the peace.
To be continued....next....
Marshall and Stilwell